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Article 8

BOOK REVIEW
Equal Rights: The Male Stake
By Leo Kanowitz
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981"

It is hard to know what to do with a book that takes the
right positions for the wrong reasons. Leo Kanowitz1 has put
feminists in a difficult position with the publication of Equal
Rights: The Male Stake. The book consists primarily of reprints and revisions of articles previously published in various
law reviews. Kanowitz sees himself as a friend of the women's
movement; he writes that "[his] perspective is that of a person
who has applauded most of the efforts and activities of that
2
movement, and has in numerous ways participated in it ....
struggle
the
in
involved
women
most
I suspect, however, that
for equal rights will reject his help and his book, reasoning
that, "With friends like this, who needs enemies?"
In Equal Rights: The Male Stake, Kanowitz defines sex
discrimination as any social or legal practice that assigns roles,3
responsibilities, or privileges to persons based on their sex.
He then argues doggedly against all laws that treat women and
men differently, or that allow women and men to be treated differently on account of sex. He adamantly resists the concept of
"benign" sex discrimination as a path towards equality between women and men.4 He includes several chapters (somewhat poignant to read in 1984) enthusiastically supporting the
federal equal rights amendment, and one chapter urging states
to pass their own ERAs. Moreover, he aims his book, in large
part, at a male audience, and attempts to convince men to join
* Editor's Note: Relatively few voices address men's interests in women's
rights. We see our review of Equal Rights: The Male Stake as recognizing and
emphasizing the continuing need for more dialogue with and amongst men who
write about this issue.
1. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
2. Leo Kanowitz, Equal Rights: The Male Stake 105 (1981).

3. Id. at 15-16.

4. "Benign" sex discrimination is preferential treatment of women designed
explicitly to compensate for past social and legal discrimination.
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women in the struggle against sex discrimination. 5
What distinguishes Kanowitz from others advocating the
same goals is his basic premise. He believes that "men as well
as women have been victimized by the arbitrary assignment of
sex roles in law and society."6 As examples of current and historical "antimale discrimination," he cites draft laws, which
compel men but not women to risk their lives in the armed
services, alimony statutes, which historically obligated men but
not women to support their ex-spouses after a divorce, custody
law and practices, which typically prefer mothers over fathers
in custody battles involving young children, and protective labor laws, which in many states limited the hours that women
but not men could be forced to work by their employers. 7 Kanowitz urges men to join in the fight against sex discrimination
because "ItJhe ending of such antimale discrimination at the
hands of the law-which would result from the achievement of
a system of legal sex equality-would obviously produce an immediate and direct benefit for males."s The fight for sex equality should not be seen as a fight between women and men, he
says; men have a "direct stake in the struggle for women's
rights ....'1
The problem with Kanowitz's approach-a problem severe
enough to ensure that the book will never gain acceptance as a
tool in the struggle for the very goals its author supports-is
twofold. First, his premise is simply wrong. Sex discrimination
does not injure women and men in the same way or to the
same degree. To say that it does indicates a fundamental lack
of understanding of what sex discrimination is and how it
works. Second, his tactics-attempting to enlist men in the women's movement by appealing to their direct self-interest-in
the long run cannot help but exacerbate the antagonism between women and men that Kanowitz professes to deplore.
To fail to understand that it is women, not men, who are
5. Throughout his book, Kanowitz assumes that the goal of feminism is a

"sex-blind" legal and social system. In fact, the desirability of pure neutrality

is widely debated within the feminist community. Some who oppose gender
neutrality argue that gender-neutral laws merely maintain the status quo because they do not take into account the effect of past discrimination. Others

argue that gender-neutral laws actually harm women because they do not account for the fact that most "neutral" standards reward traditionally masculine

behaviors and talents.
6. Kanowitz, supra note 2, at 3.
7. Id. at 27-28.
8. Id. at 3.

9. Id. at 11.
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oppressed by sex discrimination is to fail to grasp the nature of
the problem. Kanowitz perceives sex discrimination as nothing
more than the sum total of the specific restrictions that such
discrimination imposes on each sex. Throughout the book, he
assumes that he can merely point out the restrictions imposed
on both women and men, and that in doing so he has demonstrated that sex discrimination hurts everyone. In Kanowitz's
view, while women have been injured by laws prohibiting them
from voting or becoming attorneys, men have been injured by
laws preferring mothers as custodial parents. It all sounds so
simple.
What Kanowitz willfully ignores is that a behavioral restriction may be either burdensome or beneficial, depending on
the value of what is denied. That is, Kanowitz closes his eyes
to the role that a priori values play in class discrimination.
Voting and the practice of law (activities historically denied to
women) have always ranked higher in this society than taking
care of children (an occupation historically denied to men).
Society's ranking system values the things that women are prevented from doing more highly than the things men are prevented from doing. This ranking system can be (and often is)
criticized as merely a way of devaluing traditionally female
tasks. Nonetheless, an analysis of sex discrimination focusing
merely on one facet of the phenomenon--the specific restrictions imposed on women and men--and ignoring the real-world
impact of those restrictions, is next to useless as a tool for remedying a multi-faceted problem.
An analogy to race discrimination helps to illustrate this
point. Under the slavery system in this country, Blacks (in
most cases) could not be free, while whites could not be slaves.
No one, however, needs to be convinced of the value system
that forms the backdrop for the understanding that slavery oppressed Blacks, not whites. No one questions whether it is
worse to be unable to free oneself than to be unable to sell oneself. Yet Kanowitz's approach to sex discrimination, if applied
to slavery, would yield the conclusion that whites were injured
by their inability to sell themselves just as Blacks were injured
by their inability to free themselves.
No doubt individual men may be prevented by a sexist society from pursuing individually desired goals.1O It is not true,
however, that "men at all ages have been victims of virulent
10. For example, a man named Joe Hogan was initially prevented from attend-

ing nursing school solely on the basis of his sex. See Mississippi University for
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sex discrimination comparable to the kinds of discrimination
that women as a group have suffered."" In ignoring the distinction between individual injury and class oppression, Kanowitz blinds himself to the reality of sexism in this country.
Kanowitz's failure to comprehend the nature and operation of sex discrimination renders his argument not merely
shallow but actually dangerous. One of the author's asserted
goals is to lessen the resistance of men to the equal rights
movement, to convince men that the abolition of sex-specific
laws and customs will benefit everyone. But by telling men
that they have been "victimized" by sex discrimination in order
to win specific benefits-freedom from the draft, the right to demand alimony, "permission" to stay home and take care of children-Kanowitz encourages men to treat the struggle against
sex discrimination as a fight for direct benefits for men. Men
who join the struggle only because Kanowitz has convinced
them of their "stake" in the feminist movement will be dangerous allies at best, both because they fail to understand that sex
discrimination is class oppression, and because they will have
no incentive to stop at gender neutrality, Kanowitz's own asserted goal. Men motivated by direct self-interest would have
every reason to press for laws requiring all divorced women to
pay alimony to their ex-husbands, or to lobby for the repeal of
the all-male draft and the institution of all-female conscription.
At a deep level, of course, it is true that both women and
men stand to benefit from the struggle against sex discrimination. All human beings would ultimately benefit from a society
that treats each individual according to her or his own talents
and needs. The goal of a nonsexist society will not be achieved,
however, if men are persuaded to join the cause only by appeals to their immediate self-interest.
BarbaraMoses**
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (the Supreme Court held that the nursing
school's admissions policy violated the fourteenth amendment).
11. Kanowitz, supra note 2, at 28.
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